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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

-----------------MELVIN H. JENSEN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 14806

MANILA CORPORATION OF THE CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY

SAINTS, a corporation sole,
and JOHN TINKER and GENEVIEVE L.
TINKER, his wife,
Defendants-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

--

-- - - -

-

- - -

-

- - -

----- ---- ---------

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Manila Corporation of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, appeals from a judgment in favor
of Respondent relative to the purchase and sale of real estate.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent's complaint for reformation of a Real Estate
Contract of Sale and Appellant's counterclaim for forfeiture of
the contract were tried without a jury before the Honorable J.
Robert Bullock on June 17, 1976, at which time the lower court
held in favor of Respondent on the issue of reformation of the
Real Estate Contract of Sale and awarded Respondent attorney's
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fees, but limited Respondent's claim for damages to $1.00 and
denied Appellant's counterclaim for forfeiture of the contract
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that this Court affirm the judgment

1

of the trial court and award Respondent attorney's fees incurrec :
herein.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent basically agrees with the Statement of Fact

'

i

set forth in Appellant's brief, with the following additions:
Additions:
1.

That prior to the execution of the Real Esta::'.

Contract of Sale, the Appellant and Respondent executed an
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase wherein the propert::
offered and accepted was described as abandoned LDS chapel,
approximately 1/3 acre of ground, Manila City, Daggett County,
State of Utah.

(D Ex. 4; Finding of Fact Number 3.)
2.

At the time of the execution of the Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, the Appellant was the recor:
title owner of the property within the fence lines, at least to
the extent of that property which was not part of the legal
description subsequently used in the Real Estate Contract of Saii
(Finding of Fact Number 10; Tr. 74.)
3.

After the execution of the Earnest Money
d and delive:
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, the Appellant execute
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I·,

to the defendant Tinker a quit-claim deed conveying the South
32 feet of the property within the fence lines, which is the
property claimed by the Respondent in this suit.

(Finding of

Fact Number ll; P Ex. B, as attached to plaintiff's complaint;

Tr. 73- 75 , 8 0 . )
4.

That prior to the execution of the Earnest

Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, the Respondent examined the
real property being offered for sale with a real estate salesman
who was the agent for the Appellant.

(Finding of Fact Number 4;

Finding of Fact Number 8; Conclusion of Law Number l; Tr. 60-61,
72.)

5.

The real estate salesman, who was the agent

for the Appellant, represented to the Respondent that the property
being offered for sale was the property within the then existing
fence lines.

(Finding of Fact Number 8-9; Tr. 15-18, 63.)

This

is the same parcel of property that the Respondent is now claiming.
6.

That the Respondent relied upon the represent-

ations of the Appellant's agent and took possession of the property
within the fence lines and has had actual and continuous possession since that time.
7.

(Tr. 70; Finding of Fact Number 14, 16-17.)

That prior to the sale and purchase of the

property by the parties, the property which the Respondent claims
was offered for sale was entirely fenced and was used and possessed

by the Appellant.

(Finding of Fact Number 5-7; Tr. 17, 26,

70-71 )

-3-
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l!
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PAROL EVIDENCE IS NOT BARRED UNDER THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE AND APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY DENIED.
Appellant relies upon the case of Percival vs. Coope:
525 P2d 41 (Utah 1974) in support of the proposition that where
there is no ambiguity in the document conveying property,
regarding the description of the premises to be conveyed,
extrinsic evidence cannot be introduced to show that i t was the
intention of the grantor to convey a different tract or that he
did not intend to convey all of the land described.
In that case, however, the grantees obtained by
warranty deed the very land that the grantors had shown to them.
In fact, the grantee was present when a survey was made to
determine the location of the property and he expressed satisfacc·
ion with the land included in the survey.

On the other hand,

the case presently before the Court involves a factual situation
where the grantee claims that although a particular enclosed
parcel of real estate was represented as being the subject matte:
of the sale, the property described in the Real Estate Contract
of Sale was substantially smaller.

Obviously there is a great

deal of difference between being told what particular parcel of
real estate is being offered and then receiving that particular
parcel, and being told what particular parcel of real estate

1·s

being offered and then receiving only a portion of it.

-4-
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J

Percival can be distinguished on the basis that there
was a meeting of the minds, unlike the case presently before the
Court.
The objection that the grantees had in the Percival
case was that the exact parcel of property agreed to was not as
many acres as represented by the grantor and, therefore, it
limited the use to which it could be put because of the zoning.
Any statements regarding parol evidence, as they appear
in

the Percival case, can only be considered in connection with

the facts of that case.

Consequently, it is evident that

Appellant's reliance on the Percival case is misplaced.
The controlling case under these facts is Sine vs.
Harper, 222 P2d 571 (Utah 1950).

In that case, this Court stated

the law regarding parol evidence where the grantee claims the
description to be of a smaller parcel than represented by the
grantor.

Unlike Percival, this is the factual situation now

confronted by this Court.

In the Sine case, this Court held

that the contract, as written, did not express the agreement
reached by the parties and, therefore, a decree was entered reforming the instrument.

As is true in the case now before the

Court, an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was
executed, merely identifying the property as 656-658 West North
Temple.

These numbers had been assigned to a duplex which was

located on the West 49.5 foot frontage of the premises.

Subse-

-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

T
I

i
quently, a Uniform Real Estate Contract was executed with the
same description, together with a legal description which only
included the 49. 5 foot frontage.

The grantee claimed that an

additional 25. 5 foot piece of frontage was intended to be part
of the property being purchased.

As in our case, the grantee

took possession of the full parcel, which he claimed should have
been the description in the contract.

On appeal, the Appellant

assigned as error the fact that the court had admitted into
evidence that which had a tendency to vary the written terms of
a contract.

In response to that argument, this Court said:

"If such a contention could be sustained, then the
equitable theory of reformation of contract would not apply to
written instruments. The right to reform is given, at least in
part, so as to make the written instrument express the bargain
the parties previously orally agreed upon. When a writing is
reformed, the result is that an oral agreement is by Court decree
made legally effective, although at variance with the writings.
which the parties had agreed upon as a memorial of their bargarn
The principle itself modifies the parol evidence rule."
The Sine case is not the only authority for this
proposition.

In the case of Janke vs. Beckstead, 332 P2d 933

(Utah 1958) , the grantees claimed that the deed to them did not
convey all of the property that the parties had intended.

The

granter contended that the Court erred in admitting parol
evidence to vary the description in the deed because it contained
no latent ambiguities and sufficiently identified the land
conveyed.

This Court held that this is not the rule where

reformation of an instrument is sought on the ground of mutual
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mistake or fraud.

Citing 45 Am Jur 650, Reformation of

Instruments, §113, this Court held as follows:
"It is practically a universal rule that in suits
to reform written instruments on the ground of fraud or mutual
mistake, parol evidence is admissible to establish the fact of
fraud or of a mistake and in what it consisted and to show how
the writing should be corrected in order to conform to the
agreement or intention which the parties actually made or had,
II

Since parol evidence is admissible in this type of
situation, this opens the door to several further factual
disputes which required an evidentiary hearing and justified
the denial of the Appellant's motion for summary judgment.
The construction of a contract according to the
intention of the parties is a question that cannot be decided
on affidavits under summary judgment procedure where it depends
on parol evidence.

Borrelli vs. J. H. Taylor Construction

Company, 37 NYS 2d 150.
The lower court properly ruled wherein they denied
the Appellant's motion for summary judgment.
POINT II
THERE WAS MUTUAL MISTAKE SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
REFORMATION OF THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF SALE.
The evidence set forth in Respondent's Statement of
Facts is sufficient to justify reformation of the Real Estate
Contract of Sale.

From those facts, it is evident that there was

mutual mistake, as well as inequitable conduct on the part of
the Appellant.

This is all the law requires before the Respondent
-7-
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is entitled to a reformation of the Real Estate Contract of
Sale.

Simmons Creek Coal Company vs. Duran, 142 US 147 12

SCt 239, 335 L Ed 1063.
The Appellant, in its brief, says that there was no
mutual mistake for the reasons that the Appellant did not own

I

any more property than that property described in the Real Estate I
Contract of Sale and neither the corporation, nor any of its
agents, ever intended to sell more property than was owned by
Appellant.

This is simply not true.

The real estate salesman,

who was the agent for the Appellant, represented to the Responden'.1
that the Appellant was selling all the property within the then
existing fence lines.

(Finding of Fact 8-9; Tr. 15-18, 63.)

Representations of a real estate broker to a buyer as to the
quantity of real estate being offered for sale are binding oo t~
agent's principal.

This is true even if the broker had no

authority to make such representations.

King vs. H.J. McNeel,

Inc., 489 P2d 1324 (Idaho 1971).
Since the representations of the agent are imputed to
the principal, the Appellant was mis taken when it executed the
Real Estate Contract of Sale with a description that was less
than the property offered for sale and accepted.

Since the

Respondent thought the contract description was the property
within the fence lines, he, too, was mistaken in executing it
since the description was inaccurate.

-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In support of the proposition that there was no
mutual mistake, the Appellant, in its brief, said that the
corporation sole testified that the realtor was told that a
survey would have to be taken to establish the property
boundaries.

Not only did the realtor deny that he had been told

that there would have to be a survey (Tr.83), but even if he
had been, that does not excuse the fact that neither the
Appellant nor the realtor told the Respondent that there would
have to be a survey.

On the contrary, the Respondent was told

that the property was all the property that had been used by the
Church or, in other words, that within the then existing fence
lines.
Furthermore, even if Appellant said there would need
to be a survey, it could have been interpreted to mean that a
survey would have to be made to determine the exact legal description of the property within the fence lines,
Appellant's brief says that the corporation sole and
the real tor both knew that the sale was only 1/3 of an acre.
What is relevant is not what they knew, even assuming that that
was the case, but what they represented to the Respondent.
Finally, Appellant says that it could not have intended
to sell more property than it owned and, hence, there was no
mistake by the Appellant as to the property being offered for
sale.

Unfortunately for the Appellant a Vendor cannot ignore
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misrepresentations made by itself or its agents as to
property offered for sale merely on the basis that i t was not
owned by the offeror at the time.

If a Vendor does not own

property which it sells on contract it has the responsibility
to acquire title before delivery of a deed is due.

A Vendor

can offer for sale property which it does not own at the time
of the offer.

Furthermore, in this case, the Appellant owned

the property in dispute at the time of the representation that
it was being offered for sale.

(Finding of Fact Number 10, Tr. )11

Not only is there mutual mistake sufficient to justify
the equitable remedy of reformation, but there is also mistake
on the part of the Respondent and inequitable conduct on the part
of the Appellant.

This, too, under the law, is sufficient to

justify the reformation of the Real Estate Contract of Sale.
Simmons Creek Coal Company vs. Duran, supra; Percival vs. Cooper,
supra, at page 43.

Certainly it is inequitable to represent throu:I

an agent that a certain parcel of real estate is being offered for

'I

I

sale and then attempt to diminish the offering by executing a Real I
•

I,

Estate Contract of Sale with a smaller parcel described therein.
Based upon either mutual mistake or the inequitable conduct of
Appellant, Respondent is entitled to reformation.
POINT III
RESPONDENT IS NOT GUILTY OF LACHES, AND, THEREFORE, CAN SEEK EQUITABLE RELIEF IN THE FORM OF
REFORMATION.
The reason that the Respondent did not file his suit

-10-
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for reformation until 1975, even though he had been informed
by defendant Tinker that there was a dispute as to the South

32 feet of the property, was because all the parties to this
lawsuit were trying to get the matter resolved.

(Tr. 27-28.)

This was also the reason why the Respondent was late in making
his annual payment.

(See Exhibits N, P, Q, S, T, U, V, W, and

X attached to Appellant's fourth request for admission submitted
to Respondent under date of April 29, 1976, all of which were
admitted as being correct by the Respondent, to show the
negotiations between the parties from the time the error in the
description was discovered until the filing of the lawsuit, and
also in support of Respondent's failure to make payment timely.)
Respondent was understandably hesitant to pay the purchase price
until he was satisfied that he was going to receive a conveyance
of all the property represented by the real estate salesman.
(Tr. 27-28; Finding of Fact Number 24.)

Respondent's good faith

is evident from the fact that he tendered the balance due on the
contract upon filing this suit.

(Finding of Fact Number 23.)

Furthermore, Respondent offered to deposit the balance due on
the contract into escrow while the dispute was being settled.
(Tr. 28.)

The Appellant cannot spend years negotiating with the

Respondent over the boundary dispute and then claim that the
Respondent is guilty of laches.

Nor should the Respondent be

able to misrepresent the property being sold and then expect
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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timely payments on a smaller parcel until the Respondent
was guaranteed that he would receive the parcel originally
offered.

Furthermore, since the Respondent had what he wanted,

namely, the possession of the property, there was no need for
him to bring suit for reformation until he knew that the
Appellant had no intention of satisfying him for their misrepresentations.

The defendant Tinker made no attempt to remove

the Respondent from the property in dispute and the portion he
claimed, nor did he file suit against the Respondent.
Respondent was also paying taxes on the property.

(Tr. 25 .)

1

In fact,

the records of the County Recorder show he was being assessed
for 3/4 of an acre.

(Tr. 58; P Ex. 6.)

Appellant's brief says that Respondent was told by
defendant Tinker of the boundary dispute in 1968 and yet did not
mention the problem to the Appellant until 1969.

In fact, the

Respondent's testimony was that he was informed of the dispute
by the defendant Tinker in either the fall of 1968 or in 1969.
(Tr. 24.)
Appellant complains that Respondent knew of the
boundary dispute prior to investing money in the remodeling of
the old church.

It is difficult to see the significance of that

investment in terms of this laches argument, since the Appellant
is not damaged in any sense by the investment of the Respondent.
To the contrary, the Respondent's complaint for damages was
denied.

-12-
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Appellant's brief complains that Respondent should
have made the Appellant aware of Respondent's confusion as to
the boundaries prior to the signing of the contract on November
1, 1965.

The Respondent was not confused.

its real estate salesman were,

The Appellant and

Furthermore, the Respondent was

unaware of the Appellant's confusion and since the Respondent
himself was not confused and did not even know of the potential
dispute, he had no way of bringing this to the attention of
the Appellant prior to November 1, 1965, as the Appellant claims
he should.
Finally, and most importantly, the law does not support
the claim by the Appellant that the Respondent was guilty of
laches.
The only law cited by the Appellant in its brief is
the general principle that Appellant is free to assert the defense
of laches since Respondent's claim sounds in equity.

Unfortunately

for the Appellant, there are specific elements to the equitable
defense of laches which are not present here.
The other elements to a defense in equity based on
laches which are pertinent to this case are (1) lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would
assert the right on which he bases his suit, and (2) injury or
prejudice to the defendant.

27 Am Jur 2d §162, Equity.

Of the

several elements of laches, the only one set forth by the
Appellant is the mere lapse of time.

Lapse of time, of itself,
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is not decisive in determining whether the plaintiff is guilty
of laches.

27 Am Jur 2d §163, Equity.

Lapse of time is only

one, and, moreover, not ordinarily the controlling or most
important of the elements to be considered in determining the
existence and application of laches as a defense in a suit in
equity.

Finucane vs. Hayden, 384 P2d 236 (Idaho 1963).

Laches

must not only consist of delay, but of a delay which works a
disadvantage to the opposing party.
P 977 at 983 (Utah 1926).

Burningham vs. Burke, 245 ,

The Appellant, in its brief, makes no I

allegation of any disadvantage to it due to the delay.
because there was none.

This is

Laches requires an inequity founded

upon some change of conditions or relation of the parties or
property.

Holmberg vs. Armbrecht, 327 US 392, 90 Led 743,

66 S Ct 582; 27 Am Jur 2d §169, Equity.

There has been no such

change in this case.
At all times, the Appellant had knowledge that the
Respondent claimed the right to the entire parcel of real estate
within the fence lines.

This was evident by Respondent's

possession, improvements and payment of taxes.

The improvements

i

consisted of placing a trailer on the parcel of real estate in
dispute and running sewer and water pipes from the street to the
trailer.
house.

(Tr. 25.)

Respondent also renovated the old ward

(Tr. 23.)
The adjudicated cases proceed on the assumption that
-14-
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the party to whom laches is imputed has knowledge of his rights,
and an ample opportunity to establish them in the proper forum;
that by reason of his delay, the adverse party has a good reason
to believe that the alleged rights are worthless, or have
been abandoned; and that, because of the change in condition of
relations during this period of delay, it would be an injustice
to the latter to permit him now to assert them.

Osincup vs.

Henthorn, 130 P 652 (Kan 1913), 27 Am Jur 2d §162, 164, Equity.
Obviously, it would have been unreasonable for the Appellant
to assume that the alleged rights had been abandoned or even
that they were worthless .
Not only must the laches be prejudicial to the adverse
party, but it must be unexplained.
27AmJur 2d §164, Equity.

Osincup vs. Henthorn, supra;

In the case before the Court, the

delay in bringing suit is explainable and, thus, excusable.

The

Respondent was attempting to resolve the boundary dispute with
the parties in concern.

(Tr. 2 7 -28.)

Finally, it has been held that as a general principle,
the lapse of time does not bar the right to property if it is in
possession or under the control of the claimant.

Cleveland Clinic

Foundation vs. Humphrys, 97 F2d 849, cert den 305 US 628, 83 Led
403, 59 SCt 93 (CA6 Ohio).

Thus, where the suit involves a

dispute as to the title or ownership of real estate, laches may
be negatived by the circumstances that the complainant has been
in undisturbed possession of the property.
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184 US 99, 46 L ed 449, 22 S Ct 458, 27 Am Jur 2d §165, Equity
A party in possession of land who resorts to a Court of equity
to settle a question of title is not chargeable with laches no
matter how long the delay.

First National Bank vs. Mclntosch,

79 So 121 (Ala) .
POINT IV
APPELLANT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONVEY THE
PROPERTY THAT IT AGREED TO SELL TO THE
RESPONDENT BY WARRANTY DEED, RATHER THAN
QUIT-CLAIM DEED.
I

The Real Estate Contract of Sale executed by Appellan:
and Respondent provides as follows in paragraph 13:
"Seller, ... agrees to execute and deliver to the
buyer ... a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title
to the above described premises, free and clear of all encumbran,,
... and to furnish at his expense a Policy of Title Insurance in
the amount of the purchase price ... "
Once the legal description of the real property being
sold to the Respondent is reformed, the obligation of the
Appellant to convey by warranty deed and to insure becomes an
obligation upon the property described in the reformed instrumer.:
Appellant's request that it only be required to convey the
property in the original description by warranty deed and that it
be allowed to convey the balance of the property by quit-claim
deed is a request that, in effect, would reverse the effect of
the ruling of the trial court and would mean that the Respondent
has accomplished nothing by this lawsuit.

Since it was the

Appellant's own act in quit-claiming the South 32 feet to defendr
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J

Tinker after entering into the Earnest Money contract with the
Respondent and since the lower court has held that the defendant
Tinker was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice
and that his interest in the property in question is inferior to
the Respondent's, it is not an unfair and improper burden upon
the Appellant to be required to convey all the property offered
by warranty deed.

There is nothing in the evidence to indicate

that any other party besides defendant Tinker, other than the
Respondent, claims any interest in the old church site.

Defendant

Tinker has not appealed the decision of the lower court.

For

these reasons, fairness and justice should require the Appellant
to convey the entire parcel offered to the Respondent and to do
it by warranty deed and to insure it as required by the Real
Estate Contract of Sale.
POINT V
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Appellant, in its brief, claims that Respondent is not
entitled to attorney's fees.

The reason given by the Appellant

is that Respondent failed to make timely payment of the contract
payment.

It is difficult to see what this has to do with

Respondent's claim for attorney's fees.

Respondent's claim is

based upon the Real Estate Contract of Sale, which provides for
attorney's fees in this situation.

Furthermore, during the trial,

both Appellant and Respondent stipulated that the successful
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litigant would be entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee of
$1,000.00.

(Tr. 85.)
Not only should the award of $1, 000. 00 attorney's feei

to the Respondent be affirmed, but the Respondent should be
entitled to the additional attorney's fees incurred in defendin:
this appeal.

It is in the discretion of this Court to increase

as well as affirm, the award of attorney's fees made by the
lower court.

Swain vs. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment

Company, 279 P2d 709 (Utah 1955).

Respondent's attorney's fees!

incurred to date, solely in connection with this appeal, are
$750.00.

It is estimated that after oral argument and any other

legal work required by this case, that Respondent's attorney's
fees for this appeal will be approximately $1,000.00.
POINT VI
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A FORFEITURE OF
THE REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF SALE.
Not only was the Respondent justified in not making
timely payments because of the dispute, which has already been
discussed, but, furthermore, the Appellant cannot be heard to
complain regarding late payments where it has accepted them. Th:
acceptance constitutes a waiver of any objections.

Swain vs.

Salt Lake Real Estate and Invesment Company, supra.
Furthermore, this Court has previously held that a
liquidated damage provision is unenforceable if not in accord
· h equity
·
·
wit
an d goo d conscience.

Spencer
vs . Perki· ns, 243 PZd
_

-18Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

~

446 (Utah 1952).

In that case, this Court held that there

must be a reasonable forecast of damages which must also be
reasonable in amount before there can be a forfeiture and the
buyer must be given credit for improvements to the premises.
It could hardly be said that a forfeiture of the contract at this
point, after the Respondent has paid approximately $6,000.00 of
the $7,000.00 purchase price and has made valuable improvements,
would be equitable.

In the case of Croft vs. Jensen, 40 P2d 198

(Utah 1935), this Court held that where all but $200.00 of a
$6,500.00 purchase price had been paid, the Seller was _not entitled to a forfeiture and the buyer was to be allowed to pay
the last payment with interest and to be given clear title to
the property.
Even if the facts of this case justified a forfeiture,
the Appellant never declared such a forfeiture by any notice
served upon the Respondent.

The notice served upon the

Respondent, which the Appellant claims terminated the contract,
(see Exhibit B, Appellant's Request for Admission Number 2 under
date of April 29, 1976), says as follows:
"You and each of you will take notice that on the 20th
day of June, 1975 notice was served upon you forfeiting your
interest in the U~iform Real Estate Contract referred to in said
notice for failure to make payments as set forth in said notice
and you and each of you under the terms of said contract and
notice of June 20 1975' have become and now are the tenants at
will of Manila Co~poration of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints and as such, you and each of you are hereby
required to vacate the premises ... "
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The notice referred to under date of June 18, 1975,
and served upon the Respondent June 20, 1975, did not forfeit
the contract, nor could it have until Respondent was given an
opportunity to cure the delinquency, if such was required of hie
It merely says that the contract will be forfeited if the
delinquency is not cured.

Thus, there never was a forfeiture,

even assuming arguendo that Appellant was entitled to such.
Thus, not only is forfeiture an unreasonable and improper remedy
under the facts of this case, but it never has even been declarec
CONCLUSION

The ruling of the trial court should be affirmed for
the reasons that have been given.

An evidentiary hearing was

necessitated due to the admissibility of parol evidence.

Upon

the admission of. parol evidence, it became evident that there
was mutual mistake, as well as mistake upon the part of the
Respondent and inequitable conduct on the part of the Appellant.
This is primarily for the reason that the Appellant's agent
represented to the Respondent that all of the old church site
and all of the property within the then existing fence lines
was being offered for sale.

Respondent relied upon this repre-

sentation and, therefore, agreed to purchase that parcel of
property.

From the authorities cited in this brief, it is

apparent that the Respondent was not guilty of laches.

Finally,

it is also apparent that forfeiture is not proper under these
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circumstances.
Since the Appellant represented that a certain parcel
of real estate was being offered for sale and agreed to insure
title to it and convey it by warranty deed, it should now become
their duty to do so and to pay the Respondent for the attorney's
fees he has incurred in the trail of this matter, as well as
the appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

'

~I ld

c3_

David B. Boyce

gllif L

Attorneys for Respondent
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